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About 80,000 farmers are involved part time in poppy cultivation, and rely heavily on this crop and its illegal diversion to supply cash needed to finance their other agricultural activities.

Turkey produced about 130 tons of legitimate opium per year in 1968 and 1969. An additional 50 tons per year may have entered the illegal market. Total income from both legal and illegal production probably amounts to roughly \$4 million per year. Hard currency earnings from legal export of opium amounted to only about \$1.7 million, or well under one percent of Turkey's export earnings in 1967, but it is one factor alluded to by government spokesmen and politicians when exports per se are discussed.

25X1 The illicit Turkish opium is either shipped directly to Marseilles or smuggled overland to Beirut where it is partially refined and then shipped to Marseilles to be processed clandestinely in several illegal and highly mobile laboratories. The

French are cracking down on this part of the operation. About 60 percent of the illicit Turkish opium is smuggled into Marseilles aboard Turkish ships. The French have threatened to ban all Turkish ships from French ports unless this traffic is stopped.

Prime Minister Demirel is concerned over the opium problem, but he faces serious problems in bringing it under control. The poppy growing area is a stronghold of government support that might be weakened by a crash program to eradicate poppy cultivation. The Turks generally have come to accept the gradual attrition of poppy production, but almost certainly would view any sudden acceleration of the program as the result of US pressure, a charge the political left certainly would exploit.

The prospect for tighter controls this year, therefore, appears to be good; but the chance of total elimination seems slim. The ability of the government to control cultivation is improving, but will not really be effective for at least another six months.

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**SECRET****WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

The pre-Lenten Carnival held the attention of most of Latin America this week. Political activity was at its usual holiday low point.

The special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council ended on 6 February. The most widely noticed reaction was to the speech of Trinidadian Prime Minister Williams, who gratuitously raised the issue of the isolation of Cuba. (See the article "Latins Seek a New Look at Cuba.")

The Venezuela-Guyana Mixed Border Commission, due to expire on 17 February, met on 12 February. After four years of fruitless meetings, the Guyanese would like to let the commission die and refer the case to the United Nations secretary general, in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Agreement. Venezuela, lacking faith in the legal aspects of its case, would prefer to continue the talks in some form.

Although El Salvador and Honduras have repeated their desire to maintain communication, efforts to restore relations and revive the Central American Common Market are lagging. The meeting of the economic ministers of the five member states has been postponed until 20 February, and the Hondurans say they will not attend any meetings as long as Salvadoran frontier provocations continue. The Salvadorans, for their part, now want to postpone the next session of the bilateral talks with Honduras until mid-March.

Party rifts dominated political headlines in the Dominican Republic. The secretary general of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party publicly resigned his post. His action, however, is an obvious ploy designed to elicit widespread support and thereby to re-establish his control over bickering factions. In the governing Reformist Party the purge of supporters of Vice President Lora is continuing. Lora will probably announce his own withdrawal from the party soon, in order to be the candidate of another group in the presidential election in May.

Castro stated recently that the sugar harvest is still not going well. The third million ton was produced on 11 February, two days behind schedule. The fourth million ton is to be harvested by 28 February but will probably be delayed even further because of low cane yields, worker inefficiency, and transportation difficulties.

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## LATINS SEEK A NEW LOOK AT CUBA

A growing number of Latin American leaders are publicly urging a reconsideration of Cuba's present isolation in the hemisphere. The interest being generated increases the chance that some governments, led by Chile, will bring pressure on the US and other members of the Organization of American States to discuss formally the lifting of restrictions on the Castro government.

The most recent statements on Cuba's present position were delivered at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting in Caracas last week. At the opening session Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad-Tobago said that "no country of the hemisphere should be disbarred from participation" in the hemisphere's economic life. Williams has actively been expanding his own ties with Cuba, most recently by an exchange of official technical missions. In a cautious response to Williams, Venezuelan President Caldera argued that the economic relationship could not be separated from the political. He indicated that Venezuela might favor Cuba's return to the OAS for the sake of continental soli-

arity only if Castro stopped intervening in other countries.

Havana's response to the latest groundswell of interest in re-opening ties with Cuba has been mild. A broadcast last week from Havana reiterated the usual line that Cuba could establish relations only with governments that "did not subordinate their sovereignty to North American dictates." Although Castro is interested in widening contacts in the hemisphere and has taken definite steps in the Caribbean, he has long disavowed any interest in again becoming active in the OAS.

Most countries probably would agree with Venezuela that if resumption of ties with Havana is discussed it should be only within the OAS framework. If the present momentum continues, a formal reassessment of Cuba's position may become unavoidable. One or two countries may ignore present OAS restrictions against Cuba and enter into a bilateral arrangement. This could take the form, for example, of a trade arrangement such as the reported swap of Chilean wine for Cuban sugar.

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## OUTLOOK IS FAVORABLE FOR NEW COSTA RICA GOVERNMENT

On 1 February the Costa Rican electorate again handed the government to the opposition--a traditional pattern for the past five elections. Jose "Pepe" Figueres' resounding victory in the presidential race and his National Liberation Party's (PLN) retention of a legislative majority in the general elections promise that the government to be installed on 8 May will be strong.

Figueres' landslide victory surprised even his most optimistic supporters and represented for him in particular a personal triumph. He prevailed over the slanderous charges of his major adversary, government candidate Mario Echandi, and over dissension within his own party. Figueres' command of 55 percent of the popular vote--a higher majority than that of his party in the legislative balloting--indicates that he retains much of his stature as the national hero of the 1948 civil war and his mystique as champion of the common man. There was a broad reaction against Echandi's effort to smear Figueres and the PLN as Communist.



President-elect Figueres  
Former President 1953-1958

The PLN's control of 32 of the 57 assembly seats is particularly significant. It ends the four-year stalemate between the executive and legislative branches that endured throughout outgoing President Trejos' term, and could ensure long overdue action in the economic and social spheres. The PLN's independence of the minor parties for passage of legislation should also allay the fears of rightist groups that the Communists, who won two seats, will have significant political leverage.

The PLN and Figueres are activist and reformist, and over the past four years, party study groups have devoted serious attention to identifying national priorities and exploring options for responding to public needs and demands. The new government will have the advantage of a favorable economic outlook and a well-developed institutional base on which to build. Figueres has cited unemployment, malnutrition, and housing as major domestic problems and has put forward realistic proposals for meeting them.

The impressive popular mandate for Figueres and the PLN may stall, and possibly prevent, the open split in the party that appeared to many as almost certain in the pre-election period. Nevertheless there is a vigorous, semirevolutionary liberal element in the PLN that Figueres has treated with some contempt and that might cause him some political difficulty during his term if he decides against courting the dissidents' loyalty.

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